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The Challenge of Regulating IVTS/Hawala value transmission networks 
1 My interest in these matters 
1.1 Academic history 
During the course of the past thirty years my principal area of academic interest has been in 
the social, economic, cultural, political and religious consequences of mass migration from 
Northern India and Pakistan to the UK. As an anthropologist, my central focus has been on 
the qualitative characteristics of these developments, with the result that I have taken a close 
interest, amongst other things, in the transnational networks which South Asian migrants 
developed to facilitate their entry in the UK, to establish ethnic colonies around themselves 
following their arrival to facilitate the processes of settlement, and last but not least to 
facilitate on-going contact with their kinsfolk back home. I have published numerous 
academic papers exploring both the structure and the consequences of these developments. 
(See my CV in see appendix 1),  
 
1.2 Transnational networks  
Although I had long been aware of the Hawala networks which many migrants utilised to 
send their savings home, my specific interest in MSBs arose as a result of my participation in 
the Economic and Social Research Council’s Transnational Communities Programme, within 
the context of which I carried a project on Kinship, Entrepreneurship and the Transnational 
Circulation of Assets. This project focussed on the circulation of persons, ideas, and financial 
assets through the transnational networks established by Jullunduri (Indian), Mirpuri 
(Pakistani) and Sylheti (Bangladeshi) settlers in the UK. Whilst funding from the ESRC only 
lasted for two years (1999 – 2001), I continued my research in this field thereafter thanks to 
further support from the University of Manchester, the Department for International 
Development, and most recently from my own personal resources. 
 
1.3 My activities as a Consultant anthropologist 
On the basis of my academic work in this field I was engaged to act as an expert witness for 
the defence in the course of prosecutions which HM Customs and Excise (as it then was) had 
brought against three substantial MSBs in West Yorkshire engaged in making value transfers 
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to Pakistan. As a result of being appointed as an expert witness I gained access to a veritable 
treasure trove of data: the records, bank statements and so forth which Customs and Excise 
had seized from the defendants, and which the prosecution used as the foundation of their 
case against them. Hence all this material was also released to the defence – and on to me in 
my role as an expert witness. 
 
My role as an expert in these circumstances was to subject the case put forward by Customs 
and Excise to critical scrutiny, which I did. However I should also stress that my role as an 
expert was not simply to act as a ‘hired gun’ for the defence. Rather as the law requires, I 
took it for granted that my central duty was to the court, rather than those instructing me. 
Hence my central task was to offer my objective opinion as to the significance of the 
evidence laid before me in the light of my specialist academic knowledge, and on that basis 
to subject the interpretation of its significance put forward by the prosecution to critical 
scrutiny. In the course of so doing I came to conclusions which differed substantially from 
those drawn by Customs and Excise with respect to the evidence in all three of the cases in 
which I was initially instructed. I have remained similarly critical of the analyses advanced 
by Customs and Excise in virtually all the subsequent ‘hawala’ cases in which I have been 
subsequently instructed to act as an expert.  
 
1.4 Analysis and Publication 
In the course of being so instructed, I gained access to the records get by the hawaladars in 
around ten hawala operations of differing shapes and sizes – and hence to large volumes of 
empirical data about the day-to-day operation of contemporary value-transmission networks 
of this kind. As a result of my ever-growing knowledge of the operation of such networks I 
have been invited to give presentations on how the system works at The Centre for the Study 
of Financial Innovation (City of London), at the second International Conference on Hawala 
in Abu Dhabi, and for the C.I.A. in Washington D.C. As a result of so doing I have had the 
opportunity to discuss the issues with to numerous IVTS/hawala operators at a wide range of 
levels in the business, with senior officers from both Central and Commercial banks 
operating both in the UK and in the Indian Ocean region, with economic specialists from the 
World Bank and the IMF, and with fellow academics with an interest in these matters based 
both in the UK and the USA.  
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Having begun by circulating a number of reports, working papers and PowerPoint 
presentations on the subject, I moved on to set out my observations and conclusions in print, 
in papers entitled Delivering Migrant Remittances: the logistical challenge,1 Coalitions of 
Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal Value Transmission 
Systems: the operational dynamics of contemporary hawala networks,2 and rather shorter 
paper originally entitled “Hawala: criminal haven or vital financial network?”, but which was 
reduced for reasons to space to the single word Hawala3 by the publication’s editor. Given 
that most of the arguments which I have set out in this response are based on analyses and 
conclusion which I have set out in much greater length in my published work, I have attached 
the last two of these papers as appendices to this response.  
 
2 Immediate issues of concern with respect to the regulation of MSBs 
2.1 Regulation and its objectives 
Given that flow of value through IVTS/hawala networks probably amounts to several billion 
pounds per annum for the UK alone, and very much more at a global level, it is only 
reasonable that those responsible for processing these value transfers should – like all other 
actors in the financial services market – be subject to regulation. What is much less clear, 
however, is just what the objectives of an appropriate regulatory regime should be in this 
particular context. It goes without saying is only when those objectives have been clearly 
established that the next stage in the argument – namely how those objectives can best be 
achieved – can sensibly be addressed. Incidentally it is with such concerns in mind reached. I 
myself have already had several stabs at addressing the underlying regulatory issues, as can 
be seen in a proposal (see Appendix 2) which I put together in collaboration with Dr Saad 
Shire of Dahabshiil Transfer Services at the suggestion of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on International Development.4 
 
                                                 
1  Journal of Financial Transformation, Volume 12, (2004) pages 141 - 153  
2  Journal of Banking Regulation, Volume 6, 4 pages (2005) 319 - 352  
3  Newsletter of the International Institute for Asian Studies, No. 42 (2006) p. 8 - 9 
4  Sixth Report of House of Commons International Development Committee, Session 2003-4 London: 
The Stationary Office HC-II, Ev., 157 - 167 (2004) 
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In view of my long-standing concerns in this area, I am delighted that the current review is 
now being conducted, that also that it is being undertaken with the Hampton Review’s Better 
Regulation Principles firmly in mind. However in addition to those principles, I would also 
like to take the opportunity to flag the importance of a further caveat which should be self-
evident: that to seek to construct a regulatory framework in the absence of a comprehensive 
understanding of the financial processes which it is designed to regulate, and without the 
active cooperation of those who activities are being regulated is unlikely to fulfil its desired 
objectives..  
 
Having carefully read the contents of the consultation document, I am by no means 
convinced that either of these caveats have yet been adequately met. This response seeks at 
least partially to remedy some salient aspects of those deficiencies.  
 
2.2 My personal focus: the operation of IVTS/Hawala style Value Transmission businesses 
All the arguments I make and the conclusions I reach in this document have a very specific 
focus. To the extent that my first hand experience of the operation of IVTS/Hawala style 
Value transmission businesses involved in transferring value from UK-based customers to the 
destinations reaching in an arc from Somalia through the Middle East to South Asia, I can 
only speak with confidence about that sector of the value transfer market. I have good reason 
to suppose that operators serving other areas – especially in East and South-East Asia – may 
well use similar transfer methodologies. However as yet I have not been in a position where I 
have been able to gain access to direct evidence (by which I mean detailed financial records) 
which supports my belief that the same methodology is used in those spheres as well. 
 
It is also worth noting that whilst the greater part of outward transfers currently passing 
through these networks can be described as migrant remittances, a small proportion of the 
outflow, and in all probability the greater part of inflow of value passing through the network 
in the reverse direction by way of settlement, are business-to-business value transfers of some 
kind.  
 
It also goes without saying that at present it is impossible to produce accurate data on the 
scale on which value flows back and forth through such ‘informal’ channels. However to put 
some sort of scale to our discussion of the subject I would suggest that a reasonable ball-park 
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figure for the UK is £2 billion per annum, with a much greater prospect that the true figure is 
greater, rather than less than, that sum. It also goes without saying that some of these funds 
may in some sense of criminal origin, However I would go along with the consensus amongst 
the majority of informed commentators that that only a small (although by definition 
unknown) proportion of the total flow of value is tainted in this way. 
  
2.3 Lining up vocabulary: my own terminology and that deployed in the review document  
In terms of the Review document, the MSBs with whose operations I am concerned in this 
response would appear to congruent with those identified in paragraph 4.1: 
 
• Money Transmitters: which transfer money from one location to another without physically 
moving the cash. The transfer is usually to an overseas location using a variety of methods 
including wire transfers, telephone and fax, bank transfers and offsetting liabilities. A fee is 
charged for the transfer and profit made on currency exchange. 
 
However rather than using the generalised appellation Money Transmitter, I prefer to use an 
classificatory identifier which focuses on the specific form of settlement procedure which 
such Money Transmitters utilise in order to facilitate the delivery of value to the overseas 
destinations specified by their customers: with that in mind my own preferred term (and the 
term which I use in my academic publications) is an IVTS/Hawala operator – or in a word a 
Hawaladar.  
 
I am by no means certain that all the 9,767 businesses which HMRC identifies as Money 
Transmitters actually utilise IVTS/Hawala style value transmission systems: that matter could 
only be decided by empirical inspection of their back-office methodologies. Moreover I am 
equally well aware that many businesses using utilising settlement and transmission systems 
of precisely the kind I have in mind, some of whom might well appear elsewhere in HMRC’s 
categorisation of MSBs, might vigorously object to my use of the term Hawala to identify 
their preferred settlement methodologies.5 However rather than invent a more innocuous 
                                                 
5  At the Second International Conference on Hawala held in Abu Dhabi, a speaker on the platform asked  
the several-hundred strong audience to raise their hands if they actually practiced Hawala. Only one 
hand went up. But before concluding that the Conference was discussing business and financial 
practices in which none of the rest of the Conference participants were involved, I can readily testify 
that at least a third of the audience were engaged in much the same kind of business as Mohamed 
Djirdeh (the Hawaladar who raised his hand), and most of them on a very much larger scale than he. 
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euphemism to identify that the procedures which I have in mind, I prefer to continue to use 
the terms Hawala and Hawaladar, and to place both within the broader frame of those 
operating Informal Value Transfer Systems, or in shorthand IVTS.6 
 
With such considerations in mind I would like to take the opportunity that I have used the 
term IVTS/Hawala in this document as a convenient (and I hope accurate) technical 
descriptor with no necessary prejudicial overtones whatsoever.  
 
The reasons why I have raised these terminological issues right at the outset goes to the core 
of my concerns in this response. Remarkably enough, at no stage does the consultation 
document provide a detailed consideration of the way in which those businesses which it 
identifies as Money Transmitters actually implement the financial dimension of their 
transnational/trans-currency value transfers. The document quite rightly indicates that none of 
these businesses transmit currency notes overseas: like all other MSBs, Money Transmitters 
implement the delivery of value to recipients overseas through some kind of financial 
settlement process. However the document contains no discussion of exactly how this is 
achieved by businesses in different sectors of the value transmission market, even though the 
precise basis on which this is achieved is the key determinant of the cost at which and speed 
with which such transfers can implemented on behalf of customers. 
 
With this in mind it is worth noting that only reference to methods used by Money 
Transmitters go about the business of  implementing overseas value transfers to be found in 
the consultation document is a phrase which appears in the paragraph cited above, indicating 
that it can be achieved by “wire transfers, telephone and fax, bank transfers and offsetting 
liabilities.” This cannot possibly be described as an adequate technical description of what is 
of necessity a complex logistical process. Worse still, the activities so identified are so 
generalised and so diverse as to empty the phrase of any significant meaning – at least at it 
stands. Nevertheless a little exegesis may help fill to fill the issues out. Considered 
analytically, the activities identified can conveniently be grouped into three distinct 
categories:  
                                                 
6  The origin of the classificatory term IVTS can be traced to Nikos Passas’ report Informal Value 
Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; a study into so-called underground banking networks. 
The Hague: Ministry of Justice, (1999).  
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i. Telephone and fax messages, through which information – but not value – can be 
transferred 
ii. Wire and bank transfers, which can be used to transfer value as well as 
information, but only which also incur a substantial commission or fee. Hence the 
cost of transferring small sums on this basis are cripplingly large, unless a 
multiplicity of small sums  are combined into a single consolidated tranche for 
which the fee is hardly any greater 
iii. ‘Offsetting liabilities’ is a term which does not appear at any other point in the 
consultation document. Nevertheless it may well be that this refers to the 
implementation of what I would describe as a ‘back-to-back’ hawala swaps.  
If mode iii. is widely used as means of implementing value transfers by those businesses 
referred to as ‘Money Transmitters’ in the consultation document, it may well be – although I 
cannot be certain – that their operations are wholly congruent with account of IVTS/Hawala 
transfers which I have set out in my publications on the subject. Given that at this stage I am 
in no position to judge how closely the two terminologies map over one another, for clarity’s 
I will stick to my own preferred usage in this response. I leave it to others to determine how 
far any given MSBs settlement procedures are congruent with the analytical models around 
which this response is constructed. 
 
2.4 Regulation and inspection 
Just the same issues also arise with respect to the objectives and implementation of the 
inspection regime devised by HM Customs and Excise, and now implemented by HM 
Revenue and Customs. The Consultation document certainly confirms something which I 
have long suspected: that current regulatory and inspection process is exclusively concerned 
with to Money Transmitters front-office procedures: in other words with the implementation 
KYC, record keeping and SAR requirements. If I understand matters aright, this is in keeping 
with fact that to date neither the regulations with which MSBs are required to conform, nor 
the office procedures which inspectors are required to examine on their periodic visits to 
MSBs make any specifications whatsoever with respect to the structure of ‘back-office’ 
procedures which MSBs deploy in implementing the core feature of their business: namely 
the transmission of value denominated in currencies other than sterling to recipients resident 
in overseas destinations. 
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2.5 Consolidation, settlement and deconsolidation in the informal sector 
There is nothing mysterious about the settlement processes deployed in the ‘informal’ sector 
of the value transmission market. Whether implemented by a Bank, a specialist agency such 
as Western Union or through an IVTS network, the logistical challenge presented by 
remittance delivery remains exactly the same – and so does the broad outline of any solution. 
Hence it should come as not surprise that the procedures for value transfer deployed within 
the IVTS/Hawala networks with which I am familiar are structured in much the same way as 
those as those used by formally constituted banks. Directions to implement a large number of 
small transactions are consolidated together into large wholesale tranches, settlement is 
achieved by swaps of value at a central clearing house, whereupon the wholesale recipient 
deconsolidates the transferred value before redistributing it to its branches, which in turn 
make the requisite value (now denominated in another currency) available to individual 
recipients.  
 
My researches show that contemporary IVTS/Hawala systems solve the logistical challenge 
in much they same way. They also operate their own system of in-house clearing, 
implemented on a daily basis, in the form of individually-brokered, hugely consolidated 
back-to-back value-swaps. In doing so they may at times utilise the resources of the formally 
constituted banking system – mainly to implement wholesale settlements in which the unit of 
exchange is £/$ 100,000, and only when it is infeasible to all or part of the swaps using 
physical transfers of currency notes. Most such mega-swaps are brokered in Dubai, and as 
and when appropriate settled through transfers implemented on New York’s dollar-
denominated money market. But whilst the underlying financial procedures deployed in 
IVTS networks will be familiar to any international banker, the most distinctive features of 
this ‘informal’ system – namely the capacity of those involved to rely on relationships of trust 
(as opposed to much more complex and expensive bureaucratic procedures) to guarantee 
system security – enables those operating such networks to meet the logistical challenge of 
delivering penny-packets of value to obscure and distant destinations just as reliably as their 
more formally constituted competitors, but to do so great deal more swiftly and above all 
with much lower overhead costs. The key source of their capacity to do so lies in their ability 
to deploy relationships of trust to guarantee the reliability of processes of consolidation, 
settlement and deconsolidation. As a result IVTS/Hawala networks stand in a position of 
substantial competitive advantage within this sector of the global financial services market. 
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2.6 ‘Informality’ 
Close attention needs to be paid to the precise significance of the term ‘informal’ when it is 
deployed in this context. In no way should the term be assumed to point to an absence of 
records. No operation of this degree of logistical complexity could be implemented reliably in 
the absence of the capacity to transmit information accurately and reliably between network-
members. However once the issue of system-security is underpinned by relationships of trust 
between all participants, the scale of record-keeping and data transmission required to 
achieve this can be drastically reduced. In the context of a distributed system of this kind 
there is also no to maintain a central registry. Instead data is transmission is reduced to 
bilateral exchanges of information between cooperating parties within the network, and is 
largely restricted to that which is required to ensure the accurate implementation of the deal 
which has been brokered between them. Each such bilateral transaction is a component of the 
much more global set of transactions brokered between a network of cooperating partners, 
assembled, brokered and implemented on a daily basis.  
 
The cost savings – as compared with those incurred by formally constituted banks – by 
implementing international/cross-currency value transfers within the context of such a 
coalition is enormous. However the specific character of the operation also needs to be borne 
in mind. Although Hawaladars implement value transfer operations of the same kind as those 
implemented by banks, they do not take deposits, nor do they make loans: rather theirs is a 
highly specialised value-transfer business.  Moreover the essence of the whole operation is 
speed. Settlements are completed on a daily basis, and the core feature of the whole operation 
– a pair of back-to-back value swaps – is in principle implemented instantaneously.  
 
A further feature of this ‘informal’ system is that it could not work (at least in its 
contemporary format) without access to modern communications technology. Hence a central 
prerequisite for participation in contemporary IVTS/Hawala transfers is electronic 
connectivity – by phone and fax at the very least, by broadband by preference, and where 
necessary by satellite phones (for those in the most remote locations) and by TT and SWIFT 
(for those implementing the largest-scale wholesale settlements). Given all this, the capacity 
of this ‘informal’ system to shift value on a global scale is large. Multi-million £/$ value 
swaps, ultimately brokered in Dubai and implemented on the New York money market are 
consequently a matter of routine.  
 
10 
 
2.7 The monitoring and regulation of ‘informal’ value flows  
Given that IVTS networks operate with distributed systems with no central registry, auditors 
whose expectation that all financial enterprises – whether they be businesses, commercial 
banks, or indeed Central Banks responsible for maintaining the value of any given local 
currency7 – will have a central registry in which records of all transactions will be available 
for inspection invariably find themselves baffled and perplexed when confronted by an IVTS 
network. In the absence of a central registry through which to gain an overview of the 
enterprise as a whole, there seems at first sight to be no obvious way of constructing an audit 
trail of any given transaction. However this is only so if our auditor restricts himself to 
examining the data at any one node in the system. Nevertheless the data he seeks will indeed 
be available – however given that this is a distributed system, it is held in a large number of 
spatially scattered locations. 
 
Should this state of affairs be regarded as problematic? It all depends on how one chooses to 
set one’s priorities. How far should the needs of auditors be allowed to override the priority 
of low-cost service delivery? And in any event, just what priorities should auditors set for 
themselves in this context? Is the object of the exercise prudential, or in other words to 
guarantee the interests of the enterprise’s customers?  Or is it to scrutinise these transnational 
operation on behalf of the state – and if so which state and for what purposes? And if so how 
far should the former be taxed to satisfy the needs of the latter?  
 
Whilst I am in no position to provide answers to these undoubtedly urgent questions, I can at 
least contribute to the debate by dealing with one commonly asserted canard: namely that 
networks of the kind are ‘systems without records’, and hence wide open to criminal 
penetration. In my experience the first of these charges is manifestly untrue. IVTS/Hawala 
networks could not operate as efficiently and reliably as they do in the absence of procedures 
for accurate data transmission. Such data is normally readily accessible – although as we 
                                                 
7  Somalia has had no Government, let alone a Central Bank, for many years. However a coalition of 
Hawaladars has managed to ensure that the value of both the Somali and Somaliland shillings have 
retained remarkably stable against  the US dollar over the years, in sharp contrast to the achievements 
of most formally constituted Central Banks to the region. See Maimbo S. “Remittances and Economic 
Development in Somalia: an Overview” World Bank Social Development Paper No.38 November 
2006. 
 
11
have seen it will normally be distributed across several nodes in the network. Whilst this may 
make life more difficult for auditors, it is an open question as to how far IVTS networks 
should be required to organise themselves in conform to auditors’ (and regulators’) 
requirements, or whether auditors and regulators should be prepared to revise their 
methodologies to respond the character of the system in hand. The more the former approach 
is prioritised, the greater the burden of compliance costs the system’s customers would have 
to support.  
 
As an anthropologist who finds that he has wandered unexpectedly into this arena, I am in no 
position to provide a professionally-grounded response to such conundra. All I can say by 
way of comment is that if regulators are unable to find a way of monitoring the decentralised 
systems which modern communications technology has suddenly rendered feasible, retail 
customers seeking transmit small sums to distant destinations will be faced with a stark 
choice: either pay a high premium for the privilege of transferring value through the regulated 
sector, or take the risk – which does not appear to be particularly great in prudential terms – 
of using a much cheaper underground alternative. 
  
2.8 Risk and Regulation 
Risk is clearly a key issue in this context. All the available evidence suggests that 
IVTS/Hawala networks currently provide an extremely reliable service to their retail 
customers. The basic reason for this is not hard to identify. The trust-based character of the 
system is by no means restricted to relationships between hawaladars, but also extends to 
cover the relationship between hawaladars and their retail customers. Most retail hawaladars 
are either a member of, or closely personally involved with, the specific community they 
serve. They also have a reputation to keep up. Should a Hawaladar lose that reputation, or 
worse still be found to be cheating his customers, he not only faces the prospect of business 
collapse, but of finding himself and his entire extended family being driven out of the 
community of which they are an integral component. As Greif has observed,8 it is for 
precisely this reason that coalitions of reciprocity have powerful internal sanctions which 
render them effectively self-policing. That is precisely why Hawaladars’ customers are 
                                                 
8  Greif, Avner (1993) ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic institutions in Early Trade: The Maghrebi 
Traders’ Coalition in The American Economic Review Vol. 83, 525 - 48. 
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prepared to entrust their hard-earned savings to them for transmission to distant destinations. 
If, then, we consider the need for regulation of IVTS/Hawala networks in terms of the 
Hampton principles, there appear to be good grounds for suggesting that the protection of 
retail customer’s assets during the course of their transmission through the system should not 
rank high on the list of regulatory priorities.  
 
Indeed there is no sign that recent international efforts to introduce regulatory regimes in this 
sphere have been driven by driven by prudential concerns, even though such concerns have 
sometimes been used to justify specific national initiatives. Rather the primary driving force 
has been one dimension or another of AML/CFT. Hence in the UK the principle objective 
behind the forensic interventions made by the enforcement arm of HMRC has been AML, 
and more specifically efforts to interdict the financial sinews’ of drugs smuggling operations, 
whilst in the United States the nominal priority enforcement agencies has been CFT: 
countering the finance of terrorism. 
3 Law enforcement efforts to implement AML/CFT: success or charade? 
3.1 Prosecution strategies  
Law enforcement agencies in both sides of the Atlantic have prosecuted a significant number 
of MSBs involved in IVTS/Hawala style value transfer operations. In the USA most such 
prosecutions have been brought in terms of infractions of state, as opposed to Federal, 
regulatory requirements; those responsible for the prosecution have frequently glossed their 
actions with suggestions  that the funds in question were destined for – or at the very least 
might have been destined to support – terrorist activities of one kind or another. By contrast 
the majority of prosecutions brought against IVTS/Hawala operators in the UK by HMCE (or 
subsequently by HMRC) have involved proceedings either under Money-laundering 
legislation or the Proceeds of Crime Act, and in this case glossed with the suggestion that the 
funds in question were – or could only be reasonably be regarded as being – the profits 
generated as a result of the import of Class A drugs. However closer examination of the fine 
detail of these prosecutions reveals striking parallels between developments in the two 
jurisdictions, despite the wide differences in the ways in which the prosecutions on either side 
of the Atlantic have been and continue to be justified.   
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3.2 The pursuit of terrorists in the United States.  
The Department of Homeland Security has no doubts about the extent to which the regulatory 
initiatives stemming from the Patriot Act had proved to be a highly effective tool for keeping 
the terrorist threat at bay. In a press release dated 14th December 2005, it announced that   
Another system that has proven vulnerable to exploitation by criminal and terrorist 
organizations involves money transmittal businesses and related hawalas. Using new 
provisions of the Patriot Act, ICE has launched a nationwide campaign against 
illegal/unlicensed money transmittal businesses that has resulted in the arrest of more than 
155 individuals and 142 criminal indictments, over $25 million in illicit profits seized, and 
several unlicensed money transmittal businesses shut down.  
 The press release went on to list twelve examples of the prosecutions brought by ICE, of 
which for convenience sake I will only cite the first here: 
On September 22, 2005, a key player in a scheme to illegally transfer more than $100 million 
to Pakistan through a New Jersey money transmittal business was sentenced to nearly four 
years in prison as a result of an investigation by ICE and IRS agents. Umer Darr, a Pakistani 
native and naturalized U.S. citizen was first arrested in June 2003 along with five other men. 
ICE agents found that Darr and his associates were affiliated with a money transmitting firm 
called Access Inc. of USA, which operated out of a small, upstairs apartment of a suburban 
house.  The business kept an unlisted number; did not advertise in the Yellow Pages, and 
could only be accessed through an unmarked rear door. Yet through this small hidden 
business, more than $100 million in virtually untraceable funds were illegally moved to 
Pakistan. Several defendants in this ongoing case have been convicted. 
However the reality of these much trumpeted successes has recently been subjected to a 
searching critique by Professor Nikos Passas of the College of Criminal Justice at 
Northeastern University, Boston in an article entitled “Fighting Terror with Error: the 
counter-productive regulation of informal value transfers”, which is the outcome of research 
sponsored by a grant from US National Institute of Justice and further supported by the 
World Bank. Passas neatly summarizes his argument in the abstract which precedes his 
article: 
 This paper challenges the widely shared view that the United States and international 
frameworks regulating terrorist finance and money laundering (AML/CFT) is productive and 
effective. Through a careful look at the evidence regarding the formal and informal fund 
transfer systems, this paper shows that security, crime control and economic policy objectives 
are systematically frustrated by ill-conceived and misapplied rules. US federal and state 
regulations in particular illustrate how unrealistic, unaffordable and counter-productive are 
current arrangements. The paper concludes with some suggestions about how to reverse the 
ongoing fact-free policy making process.9 
                                                 
9  In Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.  , published on-line by Springer Netherlands on 14th November 
2006, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10611-006-9041-5 
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Given that Passas article is readily available, I will not attempt to further summarise the 
burden of his argument here; instead I will simply refer to his analysis as and when it serves 
to illuminate my own analysis of developments in the UK.  
3.3 The pursuit of money launderers in the UK 
HMRC’s concern with the prospect that MSBs might be a vehicle by means of which drugs 
smugglers might transmit their profits to safe havens overseas antedates the 9/11 atrocities. 
Following the collapse of the ‘controlled delivery’ strategy by means of which its officers had 
sought to infiltrate Pakistani drugs smugglers’ delivery networks,10 from 2000 onwards 
HMRC developed an alternative approach: one which sought to attack the ‘financial sinews’ 
of these smuggling operations. This was publicly signalled in an article in the Observer on 
July 8, 2001, in which David Rose reported that  
At present, about a quarter of the 1,200 UK Customs investigators devoted to fighting the 
drugs trade work mainly in following the huge amounts of money involved, a proportion 
which is set to triple over the next two years. Again, there have been significant recent 
successes. In one pending prosecution, it is alleged that a network of bogus travel agencies 
laundered more than £1bn over three years on behalf of Turkish and Pakistani traffickers, 
channelling funds from Britain via Dubai to Pakistan. 
The ‘pending prosecution’ to which this article refers appears to be the three West Yorkshire 
‘Hawala’ trials in which I was instructed to act as an expert witness. Even though the 
transactions with respect to which these prosecutions were brought antedated the introduction 
of the regulatory regime with which this review is concerned, the precise circumstances in 
which they were brought, as well as their outcomes, are nevertheless worth reviewing.  
 
Prior to HMCE’s intervention none of the three businesses were operating underground. 
Indeed precisely because they were processing large volumes of cash they had arrangements 
with Securicor to make delivery of ready-counted and bundled boxes of currency notes with 
their bank, together with arrangements to convert those deposits into US$, and to transmit 
large tranches of value into accounts located overseas – mostly to Wall Street Banks – as and 
when directed. Having eventually accepted that all three businesses were at least in part 
                                                 
10  Although HMRC initially suggested that they had been forced to abandon the controlled delivery 
strategy as a result of objections by ‘clever lawyers’, when the Court of Appeal finally came to review 
all these operations more than seven years later, the conclusions which Lord Justice Hooper and his 
colleagues reached in their judgement ([2005] EWCA Crim 1788) can only be described as scabrous. 
In addition to finding that HMCE officers at many levels in the organisation had acted in ways which 
were comprehensively in breach of due process, they also found that a number of DLOs had not only 
allowed participating informants to run rings around them, but that they had also been engaged in the 
import of heroin on their own account. So severe was these deficiencies that in a subsequent hearing 
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involved in the delivery of migrant remittances to Pakistan, the prosecution case eventually 
homed in on two classes of value transfer which it insisted could only sensibly be explained 
as efforts to launder illegally generated funds: on the one hand the delivery of large 
consignments of currency notes by couriers who typically arrived from elsewhere by car at 
the Hawaldars’ offices, and secondly the transfer of equally large sums – often in tranches of 
$100,000 – to destinations other than Pakistan.  
 
Come the trials, I suggested firstly that there was nothing inherently suspicious in 
transactions which were ordered in this way, in the sense that they were precisely what one 
would expect to observe if they represented the initial processes of consolidation and 
settlement which were precursors to much larger back-to-back swaps being brokered global 
hawaladars operating out of Dubai, and with whom the consolidating hawaladars who found 
themselves on trial had also arranged deals for the delivery of rupees in Pakistan. I also 
pointed out that the prosecution had little or no concrete evidence showing that the funds in 
question were indeed the profits accruing from the import and sale of drugs, and that there 
was circumstantial evidence to suggest that they could equally well have come from local 
Hawaladars dealing with migrant remittances who lacked foreign exchange accounts of their 
own, and/or from Pakistani businessmen involved in importing goods from overseas who 
chose to settle their suppliers’ invoices by means of Hawala transfers. However in the jury 
were unimpressed by the defence arguments, and in all three cases the defendants were found 
guilty. 
 
However two of these cases eventually came back to the court of appeal, where those verdicts 
were quashed on the grounds that “the jury should not have been directed to convict if a 
defendant only suspected that at least part of the money he was dealing with was another 
person’s proceeds of drug trafficking” ([2005] EWCA Crim 87, para 139). All three cases 
have by now been sent back for a fresh hearing.  
 
The substantive issue at stake here was the provenance of the funds processed by the accused 
Hawaladars. Were the consignments of funds identified above the proceeds of drugs 
smuggling which the defendants had deliberately muddled up with funds of legitimate origin, 
the better to obscure the fact that they had contravened the money-laundering regulations, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
they ruled that HMRC should pay 70% of the appellants’ costs  [2005] EWCA Crim 2598.  
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the prosecution believed but was unable concretely to demonstrate, or was the whole 
operation part and part of a wider back-to-back hawala swap? In various guises all the 
subsequent prosecutions of IVTS/Hawala operators brought by HMCE and subsequently by 
HMRC have all in one way or another encountered the same conundrum.  
3.4 The reaction of IVTS/Hawala operators to the new regulatory regime 
Partly as a result of HMCE’s successful prosecution of the West Yorkshire Hawaladars, and 
partly as a result of the introduction of the new regulatory regime, the many other 
IVTS/Hawala operators serving members of Britain’s 2 million strong South Asian 
community changed their modus operandi, not least by registering themselves with Customs 
and Excise, and bring their operation into compliance with NYC requirements and so forth. 
What is must less clear, however, is how far and in what ways they adapted their settlement 
processes. They clearly faced a major conundrum in that respect. On the one hand the 
prosecution had successfully convinced juries that the settlement processes deployed by the 
West Yorkshire Hawaladars were a vehicle for laundering drugs money; but on the other the 
settlement processes which they themselves utilised, and were the key to their whole financial 
operation, were – or so I would suggest – closely akin to those deployed by the West 
Yorkshire Hawaladars. But in a further paradox the new regulations did not provide any 
guidance as to how those settlement processes should be implemented, nor do Customs 
inspectors appear to have raised the issue during the course of their compliance visits.  
 
So far as I can see – and I would not claim to have a great deal of knowledge about recent 
developments, since most operators prefer to hold their cards very close to their chests – there 
change appears to have taken place in three main directions. 
i. Many local operators appear to have formally registered themselves as agents of 
larger operators. 
ii. A significant number of local operators who had formerly relied on the 
successfully prosecuted hawaladars’ consolidation and dollar conversion services 
opened foreign exchange accounts of their own. 
iii. There has been a substantial increase in the volume of back-to-back swaps 
brokered in sterling rather than US dollars, leading to a sharp increase in physical 
cash swaps between UK-based hawaladars.   
I must confess that I have little concrete evidence of the extent of the first two developments: 
my conclusions are entirely impressionistic. The HMRC register of MSBs will contain the 
information to confirm or refute the fist point, but unfortunately the contents of the register 
are not made public. HMRC may or may not have data on the second point. However I do 
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have some concrete data on the third point, largely – once again – as a result of being 
instructed to act as an expert witness. In doing so I have observed that a growing number of 
prosecutions have been brought not so much against MSB operators themselves, but of the 
agents and gophers handling the cash transfers between UK-based hawaladars between whom 
value swaps had been brokered.  
3.5 Cash settlements and their vulnerability  
As in all sophisticated forex operations, not least those conducted through the formal banking 
sector, IVTS/Hawala operations rarely lead to the export of cash from the UK. Instead those 
involved in such operations have devised a highly efficient system of back-to-back 
transnational settlements swaps, which operate on the lines which I have set out in the model 
discussed in my article on Hawala in the Internal Institute of Asian Studies Newsletter. This 
takes the form of the regular implementation of two matched swaps of equal value, one 
denominated in sterling in the UK, and the other in Rupees in Pakistan. However it goes 
without saying that the physical transfer of tranches of cash worth £100,000 is a risky 
activity. 
 
In order to cut these risks, whilst also concealing the precise character of the deals they have 
from rival hawaladars with whom they are competing for business, UK based Hawaladars 
have for some years used trusted gophers to implement such cash transfers. The gophers are 
never insiders to the deals themselves, and most usually the transfer of cash takes place 
between gophers, so the principals – having negotiated a deal with higher level global 
hawaladars – are insulated from one another by an anonymous cut-out. Meanwhile the 
gophers themselves effect the cash transfer in some secluded but nevertheless easily 
accessible spot, such as the nether reaches of a supermarket or motorway service station car 
park.  
 
However in a significant number of money-laundering cases which have recently come 
before the courts, a snatch squad of Customs Officers was lying in wait at the spot where the 
transfer was to take place. The moment the recipient took delivery of the consignment of cash 
he was arrested, and charged with money laundering. Strikingly, in most of the cases of 
which I am aware Customs Officers made little or no effort to identify where the cash of 
which the arrested gopher had taken delivery came from. Nor (thanks to a successful PII 
application) was the prosecution required to identify how and where they gained access to the 
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information that enabled to stake out the delivery spot. In these circumstances the gopher and 
the principal by whom he was employed invariably found themselves hard-pressed to explain 
where the cash in question came from: hence they were vulnerable to prosecution suggestions 
that the only reasonable explanation was that the cash was of criminal provenance, and that 
the defendants knew that it was of such provenance.  
3.6 Why implement settlements by cash transfers rather than by bank transfer 
Arguments in court inevitably led to a further question: if this was indeed a value transfer 
made as part and parcel of a deal between Hawaladars – as my model suggested it could be – 
why go through the dangerous rigmarole of making physical deliveries of large sums of cash. 
Why not send it through banking channels? My initial answer to this conundrum was a 
practical one: since Hawaladars dealt in cash, and the cost of counting, bundling and 
depositing large sums of cash was at least equal to and possibly more expensive than 
instructing gophers to make a physical delivery, and given that such value-transfers were 
immediate rather than being subject to the banking system’s routine three working days delay 
to allow for settlement, the advantages accruing from making physical deliveries of cash 
outweighed the associated risks.  
 
However it was not until I read my colleague Nikos Passas recent article that I realised that 
there was a further potential explanation. If UK banks are becoming as cautious as their US 
counterparts about holding accounts of MSB operators, it could well be that if their bankers 
were to note that they were making regular transfers of £100,000, as well as receiving 
regularly receiving tranches of a similar size, their suspicions would be aroused, and their 
accounts closed. If this is indeed the case in the UK as well as in the US – and I should 
emphasise that at present I have no concrete information which points one way or the other – 
it would be a further example of the precisely the kind of outcome which so concerns Passas: 
the implementation of regulatory requirements in such clumsy fashion that it makes such 
operations more, not less, vulnerable to criminal penetration by actively preventing 
IVTS/Hawala operators from using the resources of the banking system to conduct crucial 
aspects of their business. 
3.7 Catch 22 
That said, the current legal and regulatory system still provides prosecutors with all sorts of 
loopholes through which to squeeze. In one recent case in which I was instructed to prepare 
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an export report, the defendant was arrested in a service station car park on the M1, the 
moment he took delivery of a bag containing £60,000 handed over to him from another man 
who had just parked beside his car. A party of Customs Officers had been lying in wait, and 
charged the defendant with being involved in laundering criminally acquired funds. The 
defendant protested that he was a businessman in Pakistan, and that in exchange for the 
deposit of rupees to a similar value, he had arranged with a hawaladar in the UK for the 
money to be delivered to him in sterling in the UK, so enabling him to settle his UK 
suppliers’ invoices. In preparing I report I indicated that in my opinion such a business 
practice was entirely plausible, and that in that case it was reasonable to assume that the man 
from whom the defendant had received cash was a gopher operating on behalf of a UK 
hawaladar. I also noted a perplexing feature of the prosecution case. HMCR officers knew 
enough about the prospective transaction in advance to be able to stake out the car park; in 
consequence they must have known something about the man who made the delivery, and 
would therefore have had an opportunity to check out the (allegedly criminal) origins of the 
cash in question. Yet HMRC had did not bring any charges against the gopher, and were also 
successfully in mounting a PII application which enabled them to avoid giving any 
background evidence as to how they came to make the stakeout.  
 
However when the case came to trial and the prosecution were presented with my report by 
the defence, they promptly asked for an adjournment to consider its contents. After some 
while they decided to present no evidence on the money-laundering charges, so the defendant 
was released – only to be arrested once again under the terms of POCA. No new evidence 
was presented, but when the POCA trial went ahead it was in the magistrates’ court, where 
the only issue at stake was the provenance of the funds in question, and the test was only at 
the civil level, or in other words the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable 
doubt. The District Judge ruled in favour of HMRC, and the cash was duly confiscated – 
primarily because its recipient was quite unable to specify just where the cash in question had 
come from.  
3.8 Regulatory uncertainties as a source of risk 
We are back with our conundrum once again. If I am right in concluding that a substantial 
number of UK-based IVTS/Hawala operators routinely implement cash deliveries of the kind 
which I outline in my model, are they acting illegally? That they are risky is quite clear: but 
paradoxically enough one of the greatest sources of risk is not just that criminals might make 
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a raid in an effort to grab one of the consolidated tranches cash that had been put together to 
implement such a swap,11 but that in the processes of making the transfer Customs officers 
might swoop in the manner just indicated, and bring charges against the recipient under either 
POCA or on AML grounds.  
 
Of course there might well be circumstances in which a raid of this kind might be entirely 
justified. However that is not the point I am seeking to make here. The issue which concerns 
me is whether or not the back-to-back swaps between cooperating Hawaladars of the kind I 
describe in my model are, or are not, legitimate and above board. So far as I can see – and I 
should stress here that my professional status is that of an anthropologist, not a lawyer or an 
accountant – there is nothing illegal about the implementation of such value swaps in UK 
law, always provided that the funds in question are not of criminal origin. Moreover this 
appears to be confirmed, although only en passant, in the reference to ‘offsetting liabilities’ 
in para 4.1 of the consultation document. However so far as I am aware at no point has 
HMRC explicitly acknowledged that settlement swaps of this kind are indeed illegitimate. 
Moreover in many of the cases brought by the courts by HMRC, the prosecution has made 
use of statements made by Mr. Richard Lowe, formerly of HMCE and now of SOCA, in 
which he seeks to draw a radical distinction between ‘true hawala’ and money laundering. 
With this in mind he suggests that: 
Hawala persists as a system of cheap and effective remittance. Hawaladars operate within 
small communities in the UK. They do not and can not advertise, but are personally known to 
members of the community…. they only service their own community … Hawala services are 
not available to strangers or people outside the ethnic community they service. True 
Hawaladar are also increasingly limited by the amounts of cash they can handle. They have to 
be able to realise the value of the cash they receive. 
Having identified ‘true hawaladars’ as being small-scale operators serving specific local 
communities, but without at any stage considering just how the operators of such MSBs 
actually implement the transfer of value to their distributing partners overseas, Mr. Lowe 
goes on to contrast their activities with those of money launderers, in which ‘Controllers’ – 
who he suggests most usually operate out of Dubai, and who is  
making money on his genuine transfers out of Middle East or Pakistan, but using them to 
legitimise his money laundering in the UK. He gets paid twice to launder the money by using 
"back to back transfers" – one legitimate and one criminal. The collector in the UK will be 
able to say where the money is going and prove it is legitimate, but will not be able to justify 
where the cash is coming from. 
                                                 
11  The raiders who shot PC Sharon Beshenivsky outside the Universal Express Travel Agency/MSB in 
Bradford in November 2005 were seeking to lay their hands on just such a cash consignment.   
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There will not be corresponding legitimate documented transfers going the other way. 
Explaining the source of the cash and unallocated cash held is the key problem for a collector 
when arrested. The Controllers key to success is being able to provide a ready supply of 
genuine transactions to allow the collector to quickly dispose of the criminal cash and his 
ability to balance the books to ensure quick payment. He may buy legitimate transactions 
from third parties to ensure he has enough UK recipients for the dirty cash. The controller 
may operate holding accounts in the UK where the cash can be securely deposited to avoid 
holding onto cash. Where they collect more cash than they have legitimate transactions to 
cover, they will build up a stash of bank notes awaiting deposit. 
When closely examined it soon becomes clear that Mr. Lowe’s model of ‘back-to-back 
transfers’ is clearly wholly compatible with my own: indeed I suspect he may well have 
borrowed the phrase from my own account of how the system operates. But at the same time 
it is much narrower in scope. In the first place his model takes it for granted that the central 
motivation behind the whole exercise is criminal. As a result he regularly argues that even if 
the source of cash in the instant proceedings is unknown, it is nevertheless safe to conclude 
that if transactions are structured in the way he describes, the cash in question must be dirty, 
and hence of criminal origin.   
 
Secondly, and just as significantly, he seeks to draw an absolute to distinction between ‘true 
hawala’, which he identifies as operating on a small scale and within the context of specific 
local communities (although with no visible means of implementing the settlement processes 
which are a necessary prerequisite of low-cost value transfers), and a system of much larger 
scale back-to-back value swaps through which settlements are clearly being implemented, but 
which he insists are primarily criminally driven, and hence nothing to do with true hawala – 
although they would appear to be congruent with the ‘offsetting liabilities’ referred to in 
section 4.1 of the consultation document.  
 
Whether my own or Mr. Lowe’s model of what is going on in this sphere is, of course, 
currently being hotly contested in the courts. However as yet the matter remains unresolved, 
and so long as IVTS/Hawala operators are implementing back-to-back settlement swaps 
which give rise to large wholesale cash transfers in the UK, they are vulnerable to 
suggestions that their activities are congruent with Mr. Lowe’s model of money laundering, 
and to all the consequences that might arise therefrom.  
 
Faced with this kind of Catch22, it seems to me entirely rational for IVTS/Hawala operators 
to keep their heads well below the parapet. Moreover if this is indeed the case, it goes a long 
way towards explaining why the authorities – from the FSA through the Treasury to DFID – 
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should have encountered such difficulty in persuading operators in this section of the 
Financial Services Industry to enter into any kind of dialogue with them.  
 
As a popular Punjabi epigram puts it, no-one in their right mind puts their hand into a basket 
full of snakes, no matter how much its occupants may insist that their fangs are entirely 
harmless.  
4 The regulatory challenge 
4.1 The challenge 
Despite all these cautionary tales, I would in no way wish to suggest that IVTS/Hawala 
operations should not be subjected to regulation. Given the volume of funds processed 
through such networks – no less in a UK than a global context – it is only reasonable to 
expect this sector of the financial services sector should be subject to regulation. However the 
central challenge in designing such a regulatory structure lies in accurately identifying the 
location and character of its most pressing sources of vulnerability, and in designing a 
framework through which to monitor its operation on a basis which targets those most likely 
sources of malfeasance on an effective basis.  
4.2 Current regulatory priorities 
Anyone newcomer to the field who read the consultation document would swiftly come to at 
least two conclusions. Firstly that the current regulatory regime for MSBs was formulated on 
a distinctly ad hoc basis, and that its requirements are very loosely formulated; and secondly 
that its objectives are overwhelmingly directed towards achieving AML/CFT compliance in 
this sector of the financial services industry. Hence over and above formal registration (with 
very few prerequisites), central emphasis is on KYC, record keeping and the capacity to 
generate SARs in appropriate circumstances. The objective of these measures is to prevent 
criminally-acquired funds from being laundered through the MSB sector.  
 
Whilst it is by no means clear as to how far the AML/CFT measures with which the entire 
UK financial services sector is currently required to comply has actually facilitated the 
achievement of those goals, their introduction certainly not been consequence-free. Besides 
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incurring substantial compliance costs,12 institutions in the formal sector have become 
substantially more risk-averse. However so far as I am aware no-one has suggested that the 
introduction of the effect of these measures has been to drive terrorists and drugs smugglers 
out of business. The best that can possibly be expected of the whole exercise is that funds 
used by terrorists and drugs smugglers may have been driven out of the regulated sector of 
into its more obscure and less regulated corners, and that at least in principle, IVTS/Hawala 
networks may be one of those corners.13 
4.3 A comparison with experience in the United States 
Of course the UK is by no means the only jurisdiction which has been facing up to potential 
challenges in this sphere. Following the shock of the events of 9/11, the US has been 
pursuing similar objectives with great determination. However in the US, as in the UK, there 
is little evidence that all these efforts have produced much in the way of concrete results. In 
the course of his close examination of the impact of the implementation of a parallel set of 
regulatory procedures which have been implemented in the United States, Professor Passas 
poses three key questions: 
• How many terrorist or serious criminal acts have been prevented or detected through 
measures directed at monitoring the activities of money transmitters in the IVTS 
sector? 
• Are the control and regulatory priorities commensurate with evidence of risk and 
vulnerabilities?  
• At what costs have any anti-crime successes been achieved? 
If the answers Passas offers must have made depressing reading for the architects of the 
AML/CFT initiative in Washington DC:  
Critical as financial controls are, they are no panacea and have their own externalities. There 
is no systematic and thorough evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of current 
approaches, as evidence and arguments reveal unintended consequences. The aggressive and 
controversial law enforcement has yielded no terrorism charges so far ... In other words we 
are fighting a war on terror and shooting ourselves in the foot.  
                                                 
12   Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: Costs, Benefits And Perceptions City Research Series No.6 
Corporation of London, 2005  estimated that annual compliance costs inn the UK amounted to arounf 
£250 million per annum, and in the USA to be in the order of £1.2 billion. The text includes a 
particularly revealing comment from a Partner in a UK-based accounting firm: “Whilst we go through 
the motions and comply with AMLR, I am absolutely certain that nothing we do will deter an organised 
criminal” 
13  Any such argument rests on the assumption that little in the way of money-laundering  goes on in the 
formally constituted financial sector, and that current AML/CFT procedures will serve largely to 
eliminate what is still there. Any such assumptions are magisterially undermined in Raymond Baker’s 
recent study Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System 
Wiley: Hoboken, New Jersey 2005. 
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Of course the issues in this side of the Atlantic have largely been addressed with issues of 
AML rather than those of CFT, but if there is any substance to Passas’ conclusions, the same 
questions are worth posing in a UK context.  
4.4 A regulatory approach which leaks like a colander 
In my personal opinion, little if any of the funds which flows through IVTS/Hawala networks 
is of criminal origin. Nevertheless with Passas analysis in mind, the obvious questions are 
still worth asking. Firstly if criminally generated funds were to be passed through passed 
through the UK-based arms of IVTS/Hawala networks, what are the prospects of such 
transactions being detected, and of the criminal perpetrators being prosecuted, as a result of 
the controls which have been set in place by the present regulatory system? Secondly, and 
just as importantly, how far can we be certain that the prosecutions that have been brought 
against IVTS/Hawala operators involved funds which were actually – rather than simply 
being suspected to be – of criminal origin? In my view the answers which must currently be 
given to both questions is most alarming. For all the effort which has been put into their 
construction, the current regulations are so narrowly focused as to leave the such networks 
wide open – at least in principle – to criminal penetration to occur without detection, whilst 
simultaneously also opening transactions which are in all probability entirely licit in character 
wide open to criminal prosecution.  
 
If my model of how IVTS/Hawala networks operate is correct, it is exceedingly unlikely that 
any serious criminal who was aware of the existence of such networks would be so naïve 
walk in through the front door of a Money Transmitter, seeking transfer a large sum of cash 
overseas. Assuming our criminal has any degree of business competence, he would employ a 
more roundabout approach. Rather than approach a retail Hawaladar, he would make contact 
with a consolidating Hawaladar operating at the next stage up. Such a Hawaladar might well 
have his own front office, as well as a string of retail agents, each of whom maintain front 
offices of their own. In these circumstances the best route of entry for our hypothetical 
criminal would be to do a deal at the wholesale/back-office level – always assuming that the 
hawaladar was prepared to do business with him. In these circumstances it is would be easy 
for the consolidator to wrap up a further substantial sum in one the much larger tranches of 
value which he was consolidating in the process of implementing his routine back-to-back 
swaps, into which the cash of criminal origin could readily be incorporated.  
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Given the regulatory procedures currently deployed by HMRC, a transaction of this kind 
would almost certainly remain entirely invisible, since the consolidation procedures 
necessarily employed in Money Transmitter’s back offices are not at present is not subject to 
any kind of inspection or regulation. However precisely because all the transactions which 
occur in the process of consolidation and settlement currently take place in what can best be 
described as a ‘grey area’, such that they can be – and very occasionally are – picked up by 
‘snatch squads’ deployed by the enforcement arm of HMRC, it is in no sense in Hawaladars’ 
interests to say a word about these operations, no matter how confident they may be that the 
tranches of funds so exchanged contain no funds of criminal origin. Since such transactions 
are congruent with Mr. Lowe’s model of money-laundering, there is still a prospect that they 
could find themselves facing – and even being found guilty of – criminal charges, no matter 
how vigorous their protests of innocence. 
 
If this analysis is correct, the consequences of the current regulatory structure produces what 
can only be described as the worst of all worlds: 
• The regulations are unlikely to detect criminal infiltration, if and when such 
infiltration were to take place 
• The regulations open those whose as activities are in all probability not inherently 
criminal open to criminal prosecution 
• And therefore provide all those involved with a positive disincentive to fully 
cooperative with the authorities, for fear that they might themselves be subjected to 
prosecution 
4.5 Stopping the loophole  
That there is a major loophole here is self-evident. How, though, are loopholes of this kind 
best stopped? Before stepping into the breach with a blunderbuss, two critical questions are 
worth asking. Firstly, how great is the risk that any given Hawaladar might accept funds he 
knew or suspected to be a criminal origin? Secondly, if such an approach were to take place, 
what measures would be most likely to persuade him to report such an approach to the 
authorities, and to enhance the prospect of the transaction being detected if he was indeed to 
succumb to the temptation and accept the proposition?  
 
With respect to the first question, several points are worth noting. Most obviously he risks 
being detected by the authorities – and all the sanctions which would follow – by accepting 
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such business. But that is not all. Hawala networks are coalitions of reciprocity, and as Greif 
has shown, such networks contain their own internal mechanisms of self-regulation. In these 
circumstances members of such networks are under very significant additional pressure not to 
accept illegitimate business. To do so would threaten the integrity of the entire coalition if his 
partners became aware of it, regardless of whether on not his malfeasance came to the 
attention of the authorities. In such circumstances the coalition’s internal regulatory 
mechanism would promptly to swing into action, such that the errant Hawaladar was frozen 
out of the network, and hence of business.14  
 
Can these internal self-regulatory mechanisms be regarded as a sufficient means of 
containing the risk of criminal penetration? Whilst I am in no position to provide an answer 
to that question, I would nevertheless urge anyone contemplating the introduction of 
regulatory measures not to overlook both the presence and the effectiveness of these internal 
mechanisms, not least because they form the outer wall of a highly effective breakwater. In 
these circumstances it makes much better sense to reinforce those barriers than to overlook 
them, let alone undermine them.  
 
How, though, might this best be achieved? In my view any sensible form of regulatory 
scrutiny needs to be extended well beyond the current practice of examining KYC-
compliance in front-office contexts, and in doing so take cognisance of back-office processes 
of consolidation and settlement as well. But to be effective such measure would have to be 
implemented with care. The introduction of a regulatory framework which insisted that the 
operators of such networks should add an identity tag to each scrap of value at every stage in 
its passage though the system, including every stage of the settlement process, would 
effectively require IVTS networks to set about the task of transnational value transfer system 
using exactly the same bureaucratically-intensive procedures as old-fashioned banks. In such 
circumstances many aspects of the sophisticated response to the logistical challenge of 
delivering migrant remittances to remote destinations in the developing world promptly be 
undermined, and their current position of competitive advantage over the formal Banking 
                                                 
14  This internal self-regulatory network also serves as a highly effective prudential guarantee. Any 
participating Hawaladar who betrays his partners or clients by embezzling the funds with which he has 
been entrusted will not only be promptly expelled from the network, but his entire extended family will 
also be permanently shunned by all the global components of the entire community to which they 
belong. In other words the consequences of a betrayal of trust within the context of such a network are 
exceptionally severe.  
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sector would be eliminated, and in all probability be reversed. In such circumstances the cost 
of delivering migrant remittances to distant destinations through regulated transmission 
agencies could be expected to rise significantly.  
 
This would not be a particularly effective solution to the totality of the underlying issues. In 
the face of increased compliance costs, which they would inevitably have to pass on to their 
customers, many IVTS/Hawala operators would be likely to find themselves driven out of 
business – unless they chose to disappear underground. Were they to do so they could expect 
to find that many customers would remain be eager to use their unregulated services, 
especially if their cost structure was dramatically lower than that which applied in the 
regulated sector.15 Would this be worth the candle? A central feature of trust-based informal 
networks is that they can disappear from public view with relative ease. But if significant 
number of IVTS/Hawala operators were to execute this kind of disappearing trick, it is worth 
asking whether this would render their networks more or less attractive to those with 
criminally acquired funds in search of a laundry? And if this occurred, would it increase or 
decrease the prospects of the authorities tracking down drugs smugglers and other criminals 
by tracing the financial sinews on which they relied to support their nefarious activities?  
 
With such considerations in mind I am deeply sceptical whether the measures set out in the 
present consultation document – which effectively amount to a tightening up of, and much 
stricter enforcement of, the procedures with which MSBs are currently expected to comply – 
would bring any significant advantages from a law enforcement perspective. In the first place 
the current measures are not designed to catch criminals, but rather to exclude their cash from 
the financial market place. Secondly there is no sign that the introduction of a very much 
more rigorous framework of financial regulation – akin to those in force in Germany and the 
Netherlands, for example – would produce any better result. To be sure in such circumstances 
many IVTS/Hawala money transmitters might consequently find themselves unable to meet 
the cost and administrative complexities of compliance. However rather than simply going 
out of business, many might simply take step to alter their business model, either by 
transferring the greater part of their consolidation and settlement processes overseas, hence 
                                                 
15  So far as I can see this is precisely the current state of affairs in all those jurisdictions where all those 
involved in the money transmission business are required to register themselves as banks, and to 
conform to the full panoply of requirements which this entails.  
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putting them beyond the reach of UK-based regulators, and/or by taking the UK-based 
dimensions of their activities underground – as already seems to have occurred in Germany 
and Holland.  
 
Alternative approaches are however available. As we have seen given their structure as 
coalitions of reciprocity, IVTS/Hawala networks already sustain their own internal structures 
of self-regulation which work very effectively from a prudential perspective, and at least 
arguably so as far as the exclusion of ‘dirty money’ is concerned as well. In these 
circumstances it an approach which sought to reinforce those internal structures, and thereby 
to reinforce the existing belt with an additional pair of braces would appear to make much 
better sense. If the braces on offer are constructed with no reference to the existing belt, and 
threaten not so much to help keep the trousers at waist level but raise them to the throat, a 
different outcome seems far more likely. Rather than reinforcing the belt, such measures 
would be much more likely to cause trousers and their wearers to make themselves scarce.  
 
In the light of such considerations the rest of this response has been prepared in an effort to 
develop some more positive – and realistic – suggestions about the way in regulatory, and 
above all crime-prevention and -detection measures in this arena might be implemented.  
 
5 Conclusion: some realistic suggestions for the better regulation of IVTS/Hawala 
MSBs  
Given the ad hoc basis on which the current registration scheme was initially constructed, and 
looseness with which the various elements of the scheme are currently monitored and 
enforced, the current review is most welcome. What is much less clear is whether a 
systematic tightening up the diligence with which MSBs comply with data-recording and 
reporting requirements, together with much more severe penalties for failure to comply with 
these requirement will enhance the prospect of the authorities being able to detect the 
presence of criminal funds flowing through the system, use the opportunity to back-track 
their way to the criminals who generated such funds in the first place. I take the view that that 
is most unlikely. On the contrary the measures now envisaged seem much more likely to have 
the effect of deepening the current morass. With that in mind I would like to offer the 
following tentative proposals as to how the issues might be more effectively approached.  
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5.1 Recognise reality 
The current consultation document provides no clear indication that those who formulated the 
proposals it contains had a clear understanding as to how the IVTS/businesses which it seek 
to bring within a more comprehensive regulatory purview actually set about implementing 
their core business: meeting the logistical challenge of transnational/transcurrency value 
transmission, in such a way as to facilitate the delivering small packets of value swiftly, 
cheaply and on a reliable basis to remote destinations.  
 
To my mind an effort to design a regulatory framework for a set of financial operations 
whose character is largely unknown, and hence in all probability misunderstood, can only be 
regarded as foolhardy.  
 
If so, one of the most urgent current priorities must, of necessity, be to conduct a serious and 
objective exploration of the operating procedures which underpin this particular form of 
contemporary transnational value exchange. So far as I am aware, my own model of how the 
system works is the only fully configured financial explanation of the operation of 
IVTS/Hawala currently available. This is not to suggest that there is no prospect of my model 
being improved upon, or exclude the prospect that Hawaladars will not (and indeed have not 
already) developed all sorts of variation on my basic scheme. That said, model could at least 
be used to provide a starting point for further empirical research. The results of such an 
exercise would undoubtedly be most illuminating. 
 
5.2 Seek the cooperation of those whose businesses are to be regulated 
Such a research project could only be undertaken with the cooperation of IVTS/Hawala 
operators themselves. Likewise effective implementation of the consultation process, let 
alone of the subsequent process of implementation is likely to be far smoother if carried out 
with their cooperation. Whilst I get the impression that the vast majority of Money 
Transmitters have by now registered themselves with HMRC, it is much less clear as to how 
far this has opened up an arena in which mutual communication flows back and forth 
between HMRC staff and MSB operators. My impression is that so far, at least, the flow of 
information has overwhelmingly one-way in character, most especially in the case of the 
smaller MSBs with which this consultation is primarily concerned.  
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I also understand that both DFID and the Treasury have had considerable difficulty in 
persuading anyone in this sector to come forward to participate actively in discussions as to 
how the current regulatory framework might be improved. In my view this should come as no 
surprise. So far, at least, the only face-to-face contacts which most Money Transmitters have 
had with the authorities has been visits Customs Officers, whose central task has been to 
instruct them as to how they should organising their business practices in order to ensure that 
they comply with regulatory requirements. In these circumstances their role was primarily to 
issue directives, rather than to gain a sympathetic understanding of the business operations in 
question. Likewise anyone who has looked at official pronouncements with respect to their 
activities would swiftly appreciate that a core objective of current policy is to reduce the flow 
of remittances passing through the informal channels and to encourage their redirection into 
the properly regulated formal sector.  
 
Moreover it is most unclear as to where the boundaries between those two spheres can best be 
regarded as lying. Given the widespread use of back-to-back swaps facilitate settlement, it is 
by no means clear on which side of the boundary those operating in this grey area should 
regard their activities as falling. Given that the current consultation document does not clarify 
this issue, it is entirely understandable that those who have been placed in this uncomfortably 
interstitial position should be extremely cautious about showing their hands.  
5.3 Improve communication 
This is most unfortunate. By common consent no regulatory scheme is likely to be effective 
without the participation of those whose activities are to be regulated in planning the 
regulatory framework, and their on-going cooperation when the regulations are rolled out. 
Nor, in my view, is better communication beyond reach. All my conversations with those 
involved in running Money Transmission Businesses indicates that they would welcome the 
prospect being brought under a properly constituted regulatory umbrella. However they 
invariably accompany that view with two crucial provisos. First that any such regulatory 
framework should be prepared to recognise and accept the basic logic of their business 
models they deploy; and secondly that regulatory process should not be so costly as to drive 
them out of business, and above that it should not mindlessly criminalise their current 
business practices. Whilst the regulators and the regulated have substantial common interests, 
mutual communication between them in this sphere is currently exceedingly poor, and hence 
in urgent need of improvement. However such an improvement is most unlikely to occur 
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unless the regulatory authorities have, and are perceived to have, a much more sympathetic 
understanding of the circumstances in which transnational Money Transmitters find 
themselves operating, and the requirements of the market which they serve. 
 
In the UK as in all other financial jurisdiction in the developed world, migrant remittances are 
now a substantial component of the personal financial services sector. As a working rule of 
thumb, a reasonable starting point is that by value 50% of these remittances are transmitted 
are transferred through the informal sector. However despite the scale of this market (£2 
billion per annum in the UK?), as businesses the great majority of Money Transmitters do not 
even rate as minnows in comparison with LLPs and LLCs in the financial services industry 
with which the Treasury, the FSA and HMRC routinely deal. IVTS/Hawaladar operators do 
not employ solicitors and accountants in-house, nor do they turn to major agencies in the City 
for expert advice. Very often English is not their first language, nor is it necessarily the 
language in which the conduct their business operations: indeed one of the central reasons 
why they are able to provide such an effective service to their customers is precisely their 
familiarity with non-English as well as English social, cultural and linguistic systems, no less 
at the proximate than at the distant end of the delivery chains which they operate.  
 
Although much of what they do may consequently be ordered in ways unfamiliar to English 
observers, this should not be regarded as being an ipso facto cause for concern. Rather such 
capabilities are better regarded as an intrinsic component of their business model.  
5.4 Refine the objectives of regulatory activity  
The present regulatory structure appears to have been constructed with exceptionally narrow 
in mind: compliance with AML/CFT requirements, in order to establish a line of defence 
against the prospect of terrorists and drugs smugglers transferring funds overseas. However 
in this sphere as in all others where AML/CFT rules have been brought into force, there is no 
obvious sign that these initiatives have led to the identification and prosecution of terrorists 
and drug smugglers on any significant scale. Despite the vast and ever-escalating cost of 
compliance in this sector, whose impact has of course been heaviest of all on major financial 
institutions in the City,16 there are good reasons for suggesting that the greatest regulatory 
achievement of these measures has been to keep the elephants at bay. 
                                                 
16   Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: Costs, Benefits And Perceptions City Research Series No.6 
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That this should be so should come as no surprise: as they stand the current AML/CFT 
regulations not designed as a means of catching terrorists and drug smugglers,17 but rather to 
restrict their ability to utilise the resources of the financial services sector to support their 
nefarious activities. However I suspect I am not alone in feeling that I could sleep more easily 
in my bed if the central aim of the initiative was to facilitate the identification and 
prosecution of active terrorists and drugs smugglers, rather than to demonstrate that the 
elephants have successfully been kept at bay. To be sure regulatory crack-downs – whether 
aimed at the financial services sector as a whole, or highlighted in criminal prosecutions 
directed at Hawaladars who protest that all they are doing is implementing multi-million 
pound hawala-style value swaps – play out extremely well in terms of public relations. 
However they also have an impact on the real financial world.  
 
Firstly they impose significant costs on the customers of the financial services industry, from 
whose pockets the cost of the implementing ever more elaborate compliance measures is 
ultimately drawn. Secondly they reinforce risk-aversion, especially in major financial 
institutions; as a result they have become steadily more reluctant to take on small-scale 
customers, and especially those whose background and activities differ from the indigenous 
norm. Finally the joint effect these developments will inevitably tend to drive ‘exceptional’ 
business in this sense towards the periphery of the financial services market, and in doing so 
reinforce activity in the informal/unregulated sector, where the compliance costs of any given 
operation will be likely to be dramatically lower. This is precisely the kind of circumstances 
in which the law of unintended consequences can be expected to have far-reaching effects.  
 
Nevertheless the issues of Drugs Smuggling and Terrorism are matters of intense public 
concern, there can be no doubt that measures to contain them should remain high on our 
agenda. However rather than putting all our efforts into what appears to be a largely elusive 
goal of excluding them from access to of financial service, it would seem far more useful to 
redirect AML/CFT priorities in a much more specifically forensic direction: towards tracking 
down, prosecuting and the imprisonment of those actively engaged in planning and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Corporation of London, 2005  
17  Although the regulations require businesses to submit Suspicious Transaction Reports to remain 
compliant with AML/CFT, I understand that this has generated such a snowstorm of paper that the 
exercise is of little if any forensic value.  
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implementation terrorist activities, and/or the smuggling of narcotic substances. To be sure it 
may well be the case that following financial footprints left by those perpetrating such 
activities provides an excellent means of tracking them down; however to allow concern for 
the tracking operation to override that of reaching the ultimate goal, and then to celebrate the 
arrest of footprints as an indication that one has fulfilled one’s objectives, can only be 
described as pure folly. So long as surrogates continue to be targeted in this way the only 
people who have reason to sleep more easily are terrorists and drugs smugglers. 
 
None of this is to decry the prospect that tracking strategies, if properly pursued, might lead 
investigators to their ultimate goal. On the contrary, maximum advantage should clearly be 
taken of any opportunity to do so. However this is no sense the priority of the current 
regulatory approach, nor of the proposals for its reinforcement.  
5.5 Fighting terror with error? 
Although the precise details of the strategies deployed in pursuit of AML/CFT objectives in 
the UK differ somewhat from those deployed on the far side of the Atlantic, there are in my 
view good reasons to suggest that there is much to be gained from comparing and contrasting 
developments in the two otherwise rather different jurisdictions. With this in mind it its worth 
paying close attention to Professor Passas’ efforts to cast a critical eye over parallel 
developments in the United States, on the basis of which he has recently published a paper 
revealingly entitled Fighting Terror with Error: the counter-productive regulation of 
Informal Value Transfers. His conclusions appear to be so closely congruent to my 
own that I can hardly do better than quote Professor Passas’ conclusions at some length.   
The economic and social role of MSBs and remittance providers in particular needs to be 
emphasized and publicized. Banks could be offered incentives, so that they maintain old and 
open new accounts for legitimate and compliant MSBs. At the same time, it is essential to 
define the role of banks with respect to due diligence and risk management, so that it becomes 
crystal clear that they are indeed not expected in practice to police this financial sector. Along 
these lines, incentives for high quality and well implemented AML/CFT programs at banks 
and MSBs would be helpful. Rules must be enforced consistently and through due process. 
Line agents and examiners need to be made aware of the context and rules as well as other 
guidance and ‘best practice statements issued by their own and related organizations. 
 
Law enforcement actions must be taken on the basis of good evidence that may be produced 
in a court of law. If the available evidence is not ‘actionable’ and originates from intelligence 
gathering methods that cannot be disclosed, the best way forward is to follow the money and 
monitor suspects and their activities. In this way, controllers will be able to prevent harm and 
produce evidence against important players and critical nodes of financing systems. All issues 
raised in this paper (security, due process, rule of law, fairness, economic policy objectives, 
perception issues, etc.) can thus be addressed in a pragmatic fashion simultaneously. Outreach 
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to all stakeholders, seminars and training of agency staff and financial institution officials is 
vital for the achievement of all these goals as is the independent and critical analysis of 
available information on terrorist finance, money laundering or other serious crime. 
 
The need to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of current approaches to determine at what point 
we face an issue of diminishing returns is urgent. Measures deployed originally for the fight 
against often substantial amounts involved in money laundering have not shown their desired 
effect on serious crime. Yet, they are hurriedly applied as terrorist financial controls, where 
the amounts are mostly trivial. Studies illustrate that the currently non-transparent trade, for 
instance, is extremely vulnerable to abuse for the support of terrorism, arms proliferation, 
corruption and other serious crimes. It takes well-designed research, solid data and thoughtful 
analysis to uncover the highest risks, worse threats and top policy priorities. 
 
Fact-free policy making has unsurprisingly failed. It is hoped that the steps recommended 
here will be followed and will prove instrumental to a more secure, peaceful and prosperous 
international community. Of course, criminal justice can only address the manifestation of 
structural and socio-economic problems. For the long-term success of counter-terrorism, 
addressing the root causes of conflicts at the same time is a condition sine qua non.18 
 
That there are differences in the way in which the issues have been tackled – or at least 
perceived – as between the US and the UK is plain to see. Hence whilst American assaults on 
IVTS networks have overwhelmingly been framed around the prospect that they were, or at 
least could be used as, channels through which terrorist activities were being financed, in 
Britain  criminal prosecutions directed at Hawala networks have invariably been articulated 
around suggestions that the funds being transferred were the product of drugs smuggling. 
However in both contexts little or no concrete evidence was produced to demonstrate that the 
funds in question were indeed either destined for or the product of the specified activities; 
and most saliently of all, none of these interventions appear to have provided a means by 
which the authorities were able to track down and prosecute anyone actively engaged in 
either terrorism or drugs smuggling. In these circumstances it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that by attacking surrogate these convenient surrogate targets the authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic have been engaging in what can best be described as a charade, such that they 
were able successfully to claim that they were making significant progress in their self-
proclaimed wars on terror and/or drugs. 
 
None of this is to suggest that the prospect of further terrorist atrocities, let alone on-going 
flood of narcotics represents as a much of a threat to public security in Western Europe as it 
                                                 
18   Nikos Passas “Fighting Terror with Error: the counter-productive regulation of Informal Value 
Transfers” in Crime, Law and Social Change, published on-line by Springer Netherlands on 14th 
November 2006. 
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does in North America. Nor is it to deny a further feature of our contemporary situation: that 
the police and the security services are struggling to find effective responses to a very real 
threat. The issue here is precisely as Professor Passas puts it: are the AML/CFT strategies 
which have so far been developed in response to these developments being implemented in 
such a way as to be fit for purpose? Or are we in the UK making the same mistakes as he 
suggests are being made in the US, by fighting a war on terror by shooting ourselves in the 
foot? 
 
Professor Passas’ analogy does indeed seem to be entirely apt in a UK context. All serious 
investigators are agreed that the best way of tracking down criminals and gaining access to 
the evidence required to bring them to court is by seeking the assistance of the non-criminal 
members of the community within which the criminals operate, and on whose services those 
criminals rely as they set about their nefarious business. In these circumstances it makes 
immediate sense for the authorities to keep a regulatory eye on the services which such 
criminals might consequently seek to utilise. IVTS/Hawala networks are undoubtedly 
services of that kind. However the introduction of hostile regulatory initiatives whose most 
likely effect is either to drive them out of business and/or lead them to conduct their 
operations underground can in my view be aptly described shooting ourselves in the foot. All 
remaining prospects of the authorities gaining the confidence of the law-abiding members of 
the communities within which such malefactors operate will rapidly evaporate, and the 
prospects of more open communication with the authorities will be further closed down. 
Osama bin Laden could not have plotted a better outcome if he had done it himself.  
 
Roger Ballard 
8th December 2006 
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and Dr Saad Shire, Dahabshiil Transfer Services 
 
A STRATEGICALLY INFORMED APPROACH TO REGULATORY INITIATIVES FOR IFT/HAWALA 
SYSTEMS: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
We would strongly commend the arguments set out in the statement issued at the close of proceedings of 
the 2nd International Conference on Hawala in Abu Dhabi, and most especially its explicit recognition that 
informal funds transfer (1FT) systems playa key role in facilitating remittances, and that as such they now 
form an integral part of the international financial system. More specifically, we would also argue that any planned 
regulatory regime should recognize that 
 
1. Such systems are not deposit-holding banks: rather they are specialist inter-currency funds 
transmission agencies, aiming to deliver funds entrusted to them within 24 hours. 
 
2. Regulatory systems will only work effectively if they are designed to fit the specific character of the 
processes being regulated, and take cognisance of the specific (and varying) socio-cultural character of the 
customer base in the community which each IFT system serves. 
 
3. Relatively little is known about the varying character of  IFT systems in different parts of the globe: 
our knowledge-base must be improved if effective and appropriate regulatory regimes are to be established. 
 
4. The imposition of inappropriately draconian regulatory regimes will simply drive 1FT yet further 
underground, so defeating the object of the exercise. 
 
5. In constructing such exercises, the precise objectives of the regulatory structure must be carefully 
spelled out, and the utility of all proposals must be carefully scrutinised from both a cost/benefit and a fit-for- 
purpose perspective. 
 
6. The fact that IFT systems frequently transfer funds on behalf of commercial businesses, charities and 
so forth besides retail customers should not be overlooked. 
 
7. In pursuit of the efficient implementation of long-distance inter-currency value transmissions, IFT 
systems routinely implement standard forms of banking practice, including the consolidation and 
deconsolidation of funds in large tranches to facilitate settlement processes. Whilst these processes are the 
key to the commercial success of IFT, it is at this level that criminally-sourced funds could most easily be 
slipped into the system. To that extent current know-your-(retail)customer regulations appear to be poorly 
focused viz to the task in hand. 
 
8. Contemporary IFT systems are in a constant date of development, and many have achieved a higher 
level of electronic sophistication than the banks; the ever-wider use of advanced technology improves rather 
than threatens-the prospects for more effective exclusion of criminal malfeasance. 
 
9. Effective regulation is only likely to be achieved in the context of close cooperation with IVT operators: 
top-down initiatives, especially if draconian in character, are likely to be precipitate counter-productive 
outcomes. 
 
10. IFT operators should therefore be encouraged: 
(i) To publicly identify themselves, preferably in incentivised registration schemes 
(ii) To gather themselves together into formally constituted organisations 
and with whom the authorities would consequently be able to negotiate on a collective basis 
 
11. Efforts should be made to develop and support (rather than to condemn) the operational and 
managerial practices currently deployed by IFT operators. Such an initiative could usefully be facilitated 
by an international or a regional development agency. 
 
12. In the interest of facilitating the further development of legitimate 1FT, greater efforts should be made 
to harmonise regulations across countries. The mutual recognition of national regulations (eg within the 
European Union) would simultaneously facilitate growth, greater operational efficiency and the more 
effective exclusion of potentially criminal transactions. 
 
April 2004 
See also the Conference Statement from the Second International Conference on Hawala, available at: 
http://www.cbuae.gov.ae/Hawala/statement-E.htm  
